Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.

Direction: Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow. Certain words are printed in bold to help you locate them while answering some of these.

Since the days of the Nixon administration, nearly 50 years ago, American policy has aimed to steer China out of its isolation to prosper in the global market economy. There needn’t be a conflict between the established superpower and the emerging giant, the best strategic minds argued. As it grew rich, they reasoned, China could be integrated peacefully into the institutional framework built by the Western powers from the rubble of World War II. The proposition fit with the “liberal peace” view of foreign relations: that nations engaged in intense economic intercourse would find it too costly to go to war. American businesses that flocked to China to tap its cheap labour and huge consumer market after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 enthusiastically agreed with the approach.

That strategy, it appears, is now over. President Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose a battery of tariffs against as much as $60 billion worth of Chinese goods while restricting Chinese investments in American technology companies has set policy onto a different, more belligerent path. China is now, in the president’s words, an “economic enemy.” Interestingly, not all scholars have opposed the change of tone. Many foreign policy experts agree that China is not playing by the rules. American businesses, which typically endorsed forbearance to protect their market access to China, have grown frustrated at its appropriation of their intellectual property.

John Mearsheimer, a foreign policy expert at the University of Chicago, doesn’t buy the idea of liberal peace. In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” published in 2001, he wrote, “A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.” And yet Mr. Trump’s hard-line approach to China seems destined to fail. Taking a stand against China’s abusive behaviours is not necessarily wrong. The problem with the president’s game plan is that it is inconsistent with all the other diplomatic initiatives he has taken so far. The tangle of stabs and swipes at allies and rivals alike, in the service of ill-conceived goals like closing a trade deficit, serves China more than it does the United States. “Trump has been a godsend for China,” noted Eswar Prasad, an expert on trade at Cornell University who once headed the China division at the International Monetary Fund. “China has manipulated the rules, but Trump’s response is counterproductive.”

China is clearly chafing at the rules put together by the West. It openly disagrees with the post-war apportionment of the South China Sea. It is more than willing to flout the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rules to build its domestic technological expertise. Several Chinese initiatives — its One Belt, One Road effort to build infrastructure to connect to Central Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership it hopes to negotiate with its Asian neighbours, and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank — are aimed at building an institutional framework to rival the trade agreements and multinational financial institutions supported by the West.